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Abstract. This paper presents the detailed components of the Future Active IP 
Networks (FAIN) [1] [2] [3] active node framework based on the novel Virtual 
Environment (VE) concept. It also presents the dynamic and autonomic de-
ployment of differentiated services and the configuration capabilities thereof 
enabled. The FAIN node supports the dynamic deployment and instantiation of 
multiple active VEs, each one of them capable of hosting multiple Execution 
Environments (EE) and supporting communication among different EEs in the 
same node. The EEs may, in turn, be deployed and instantiated on demand 
thereby introducing new features and functionality in the node according to new 
requirements and arising needs. We tested the FAIN active network by develop-
ing and dynamically deploying a control EE, which was designed and tested for 
the QoS configuration of the Diffserv-enabled pan-European FAIN testbed [4]. 
The work presented in this paper was performed in the European Union re-
search and development project under the Information Society Technologies 
programme. 
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1   Introduction 
In the world of network architectures, we are experiencing a significant paradigm 
shift resulting in new technologies and approaches. The motivation behind this shift is 
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the still elusive goal of rapid and autonomous service creation, deployment, activation 
and management, resulting from new and ever changing customer and application re-
quirements. Research activity in this area has clearly focused on the synergy of a 
number of concepts: programmable networks and services, managed networks, net-
work virtualisation, open interfaces and platforms, application level programming and 
increasing degrees of intelligence inside the network. Next generation networks must 
be capable of supporting a multitude of service providers that exploit an environment 
in which services are dynamically deployed and quickly adapted over a common het-
erogeneous physical infrastructure, according to varying and sometimes conflicting 
customer requirements. 
Programmable and Active Networks have been proposed as a solution for the fast, 
flexible and dynamic deployment of new network services. These networks aim at 
providing easy introduction of new network services by adding dynamic programma-
bility to network devices such as routers, switches and applications servers. The basic 
idea is to enable third parties (end users, operators, and service providers) to inject 
application-specific services (in the form of code) into the network. Applications are 
thus able to utilize the required network capabilities in terms of optimised network re-
sources and as such they are becoming network-aware. Programmable networks allow 
dynamic injection and deployment of code as a promising way of realising applica-
tion-specific service logic, or performing dynamic service provision on demand. The 
viable architectures for programmable networks have to be carefully engineered to 
achieve suitable trade-offs between flexibility, performance, resilience, security and 
manageability. 
In this paper we present the detailed components of the FAIN active node, and the 
dynamic deployment of differentiated services and the configuration thereof enabled 
by a novel active and programmable node architecture. More specifically, in section 2 
we describe the FAIN active node architecture and its major components. The focus is 
on the deployment and instantiation of VEs and EEs as host environments for the in-
troduction of new functionality. In Section 3 we present the design and implementa-
tion of a secure control EE that is based on the SNMP [11] and hosts a control proto-
col. In Section 4 we demonstrate the uses of the deployed control EE for the dynamic 
configuration of a Diffserv network in order to provide the required levels of QoS. Fi-
nally conclusions and future work are presented in section 5. 
2   FAIN Active Node 
Figure 1 depicts the major components of the FAIN programmable node and its inter-
action with the management node, which includes at both network and element levels 
an Active Service Provisioning (ASP) and a Policy Based Network Management Sys-
tem (PBNM) components [9]. When the FAIN node boots up a Privileged VE is 
automatically instantiated and a new component is installed, namely the VE manager, 
which implements the VE management framework. This component offers access to a 
number of node services that are deemed necessary to configure and setup the node. It 
is used for instantiating new VEs together with appropriate EEs and to install compo-
nents therein which potentially offer new control interfaces that allow services inside 
VEs to customise resources according to application-specific requirements. 
192         T. Suzuki et al. 
The VE manager is complemented with the security component (SEC) that offers a 
set of security services and enforces node policies, the resource control component 
(RCF) responsible for implementing the FAIN resource control framework and the 
demultiplexing/multiplexing component (De/MUX) which delivers packets to the 
right VE and EE. In the subsequent sections we describe each one of these compo-
nents in detail. 
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Fig. 1. Initial Components of the FAIN Active Node 
In our architecture, multiple EEs can be executed in one VE since the unit for man-
agement is VE not EE. Therefore interaction between EEs is allowed. On the other 
hand, the conventional works for active networks are mainly contributed to make new 
possibilities in one EE. Therefore interaction between EEs looks out of scope in the 
past researches. In this sense, the concept of VE is the most crucial idea. Another 
benefit of VE is related to the accounting. The real VE is composed of multiple re-
sources. Therefore it provides easy accounting based on the resource consumption. 
2.1   Virtual Environment Management 
As we have mentioned before, services are installed in VEs and eventually instanti-
ated and executed inside the associated EEs. In FAIN, services are described accord-
ing to a component-based approach. As such a service is defined as a graph of service 
components, which in turn can be developed and deployed independently as and when 
needed [3][5]. It is an advantage when the hosting environments for services, i.e. the 
execution environments are also component-based. This allows to move aspects such 
as lifecycle management, dynamic configuration, access control, monitoring, etc. to a 
supporting framework and avoid re-implementation inside the service code. The im-
plementation of the VE management is an example for this. 
During the boot procedure of the FAIN active node, the privileged virtual envi-
ronment is started together with a default execution environment. Any subsequently 
created virtual environment will need some basic resources in order to support service 
installation and component instantiation. For this reason various resource managers 
are installed inside the privileged virtual environment during the boot procedure as it 
is shown in figure 2. 
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Fig. 2. Initial manager components of FAIN active node 
The privileged execution environment runs in the context of the privileged virtual 
environment. Inside the privileged execution environment there exist the resource 
managers for the basic services. They will be used to create resources for other virtual 
environments. These basic resource managers comprise the following:  
A Virtual Environment Manager is used for the creation of new virtual environ-
ments. This manager will examine the resource profile submitted as part of a VE crea-
tion policy and try to create any referenced resource using other basic managers. The 
resulting resource components will be inherited by the new virtual environment. A 
number of Execution Environment Managers are used for the creation of specific exe-
cution environments. Since running instances of services can exist only inside execu-
tion environments, there has to be at least one execution environment attached to any 
virtual environment. A Security Manager is a core component of the security architec-
ture that exports a minimal set of interfaces to other node subsystems. A Channel 
Manager is used for creating channels to receive and send packets from and to the 
network. A Diffserv Manager is used for creating Diffserv controllers to control par-
ticular packet flows based on priorities. 
2.2   Demultiplexer and Multiplexer: De/MUX 
Our framework supports multiple VEs and multiple EEs running in VEs and as such 
the packets are delivered to the right entity inside a node. To this end packets must 
carry all the necessary information based on which the De/MUX component may 
forward the packet to its destination inside the node. In this case, we need to specify 
both environments, the VE and EE, to execute real processing to active packet data. 
We have adopted the Active Network Encapsulation Protocol (ANEP) [7] for the 
FAIN active packet data and extended its definition by introducing two new options: 
one for the VE identifier and one for the EE identifier. 
 
 
0 
  31 
N 4N+ 0 byte 4N+ 1 byte 4N+ 2 byte 4N+ 3 byte 
0 FLG option type option length 
1 VE-ID or EE-ID (32bit) 
Fig. 3. VE/EE identifier 
The formats for two new options are the same as shown in figure 3. The FLG indi-
cates how to handle the option data. The owner of the option defines the value of the 
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FLG. The option type indicates a type of option. The value of the option type for VE 
and EE identifiers are 101 and 102 which were defined for the FAIN VE environ-
ment. The option length specifies the size of option field in 32 bit words. The value of 
the option length for the VE-ID or EE-ID is 2 in 32 bit words. The VE-ID or EE-ID 
indicates an identifier to transmit active packets to a proper VE/EE.  
In figure 4, we present the block diagram of packet data delivery. 
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Fig. 4. Block diagram of packet delivery 
Active (ANEP) packet data delivery. (1) A client requests a Channel Manager to 
create a new Active Channel for receiving ANEP packet data by registering a VE-ID, 
an EE-ID and an object reference of itself or a socket port number. (2) The Channel 
Manager creates the Active Channel by registering an active consumer object, which 
includes the VE-ID, the EE-ID and the reference or the socket port number, into an 
internal table for active packets. (3) The packet filter transmits the received ANEP 
packet to the Channel Manager since the manager sets conditions to intercept ANEP 
packets at the booting process. The filter could be implemented by the Netfiler [8]. (4) 
The Channel Manager calls a security function for checking the ANEP packet before 
sending it to a proper client. (5, 6) After executing the security check, the Channel 
Manager sends the ANEP packet data to the proper client through an appropriate 
Active Channel by getting a target from the internal table. The table includes the 
relation between VE-ID/EE-ID and the target receiver. (7) If there is an ANEP packet 
to be sent to another node, the client sends the ANEP packet to the proper Active 
Channel. (8) The Active Channel inserts the security information into the ANEP 
packet by interacting with the security component before sending it to the outside 
network. (9) After that, the Active Channel transmits the ANEP packet to the outside 
network. 
Data (Non-active) packet data delivery. (10) A client requests the Channel Manager 
to create a new Data Channel for receiving non-active packet by registering flow 
conditions and object reference of itself or a socket port number. (11) The Channel 
Manager sets the filter conditions such as a source IP address and so forth. (12) The 
Channel Manager creates the Data Channel object, which includes the flow conditions 
and the reference or the socket port number. (13) The filter transmits data packet to 
the Channel Manager. (14, 15) The Channel Manager sends data packet to a proper 
Dynamic Deployment and Configuration of Differentiated Services         195 
client through an appropriate Data Channel. (16) If there are some packet data to be 
sent to another node, the client sends them to the proper Data Channel. (17) The Data 
Channel transmits data packet to the outside network. 
2.3   Resource Control Framework 
RCF (Resource Control Framework) has been designed by taking strongly into 
consideration and exploiting the capabilities of the component model that has been 
introduced in the VE management framework that was previously described. The part 
of RCF that is responsible for the management of the resources is actually part of the 
VE Management framework while the run-time control of the resources is done by 
other lower level RCF components. RCF can be defined as the aggregation of all the 
FAIN active node components that operate and interact in order to control and 
manage resources. As it is depicted in figure 5, there are the component families of 
the RCF. 
RMRCA RCA RCA
RMRC
resources
VEM
client
VE
 
Fig. 5. RCF Architecture 
Resource Controller (RC). RC is the responsible entity for the runtime control of a 
resource inside the active node. RC can be a component running in the Kernel Space 
of the node for a software router or can be a specific device of a hardware router. It 
can be the Traffic Control framework of the Linux. Every RC has an interface that 
allows its runtime configuration, which includes the allocation and monitoring of the 
resources.  
Resource Manager (RM). For every RC, an RM exists in the user space. It is 
responsible for the configuration of the corresponding RC in order to enforce the 
resource partitioning among the various VEs. Moreover, the RMs are responsible for 
the RCAs creation, configuration and management. Among others the RMs are 
responsible for the Admission Control of the incoming requests for new allocations 
and for the realization of the allocation by configuring the corresponding RCs. 
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Resource Controller Abstraction (RCA). For every resource capacity that is 
allocated to a VE, an RCA of that resource is created. For every VE, a resource 
controller abstraction (RCA) exists that represents part of the RC functionality to the 
VE client: the part of the resource that has been allocated to the VE. The RCAs export 
interfaces and accept requests by VE owners and/or users for resource access. 
Resource access includes requests for resource consumption and management. RCAs 
check those requests against resource status and the requested entities' privileges and 
enforce the valid requests by configuring the corresponding RCs accordingly. 
 
In FAIN we adopted a two-phase approach for admission control, namely, the crea-
tion phase and the activation phase. We note here that the creation and activation of a 
VE is part of a larger activity, which results in the creation, and activation of a virtual 
network across the entire active network. During the creation phase, the client re-
quests the creation of a new VE. The VEM passes these requirements to the corre-
sponding RMs. Every RM decides if the requested allocation can be carried out or 
not. When the VEM has collected all the replies from the RMs, it decides if the new 
VE may be admitted or not. If any of the RMs is unable to provide the requested re-
source capacity, the admission of the VE is aborted while the VEM informs all RMs 
that they have to release any pre-allocated resources.  
When all the replies from the RMs are positive, the VEM replies positively as well. 
But even then, the VEM does not activate the newly created VE and the resources 
remain preallocated. If the creation of all VEs across the entire active network nodes 
has succeeded, only then the newly created VEs are activated. The activation request 
arrives at the VEM from the Network management station, which collects and checks 
all the responses from the VEMs of the nodes across the active network. In this case, 
the VEM gets in contact with all the involved RMs in order to activate the RCAs, 
configure the RCs accordingly, and enforce the appropriate resource allocations.  
We have implemented two types of resource controller. The one is a bandwidth 
controller of a software router based on Linux. The other is a controller of the Diff-
serv functions of a hardware router. In this paper, the Diffserv control and manage-
ment are presented as an example of the RCF implementation. The Diffserv controller 
and the hardware router are regarded as the RCA and the RC respectively. 
2.4   FAIN Security Architecture 
We propose high level security architecture as shown in the figure 6. Basic security 
services are positioned in the privilege VE because of the following reasons: we want 
to treat all possible technologies and their implementations, implementing VE and 
services in the one and only one manner, reducing the risk of multiple implementa-
tions, and the services offered in the pVE are protected again with the same services 
and mechanisms. This doesn't preclude VEs or services from implementing their own 
security services or mechanisms when it is reasonable to do so.  
The FAIN security architecture was designed as a complete security solution for 
programmable and active node. It provides two level communication security, au-
thorization and policy enforcement on the node, static and dynamic code verification, 
system integrity and accountability through audit service and logging. Only the first 
three aspects will be briefly described.  
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Two level communication security is provided for active packets with hop-by-hop 
protection in between two neighbor nodes based on symmetric cryptography and end-
to-end authentication of data origin of the static parts of the active packets based on 
asymmetric cryptography. Two ANEP options were designed to support two level 
protection: hop-by-hop option, with security association identifier, replay protection 
field and keyed hash, and credential option with credential filed, type and location, 
optional timestamp and target and digital signature field. Multiple credential options 
can be in the packet related to different users, which digital signatures cover static 
parts of the packet. Communication security is supported with a protocol for auto-
matic establishment of security association between nodes and protocol for exchang-
ing user credentials between nodes in a hop manner. For efficient operation creden-
tials are cached on nodes. Management sessions to nodes use CORBA over SSL and 
credential used (X.509v3 certificates with extended attributes) were handled in the 
same manner as user credentials supplied in the active packet. 
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Fig. 6. High level security architecture 
Authorization and policy enforcement on the nodes is provided by transparent en-
forcement layer, based on CORBA interceptors, components/packets security context 
and two level policy. Security context is build from user supplied credentials either in 
active packet or exchanged during SSL session negotiation. Low level policy is man-
datory and it is enforced based on VE and service/EE identifiers, while high level pol-
icy allows fine grain discretional control. Multiple types of security policies can be 
supported by the system; we have implemented a simple one based on user roles like 
VE manager, manager, observer, user etc. Enforcement layer enables us to control ac-
cess to the level of component interface or port while component run time instance 
can be a thread or a process. Static Code verification is based on digital signature 
mechanism while dynamic verification, like in SNAP case, see section 3., was en-
abled with separation of variable data (SNAP packet) and its static part, data origin 
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authentication, same as used for communication security, and code verification per-
formed by ASPE, see section 3.2. 
3   A Secure Control EE (Active SNMP-EE)  
The Active SNMP-EE is the control EE in FAIN. This EE is realized with the Safe 
and Nimble Active Packets (SNAP) interpreter [6][10][12]. The Active SNMP-EE 
consists of two components: a) SNAP Activator that generates SNAP packet pro-
grams with various SNMP commands; b) ANEP-SNAP Packet Engine (ASPE) that 
provides ANEP encapsulation and security provisioning for SNAP active packets 
across nodes. In the Active SNMP-EE, the active extensions were realized by using 
an extensible SNMP [11] agent. The Active SNMP-EE is able to execute SNMP 
primitives. The SNAP Activator generates SNAP packet programs that carry SNMP 
commands. SNAP packet programs are encapsulated into ANEP for the purpose of in-
tegration and interoperability. Further details of the SNAP Activator can be found at 
[1]. Noted that SNAP is a light-weight protocol, it has no facility for authentication at 
all. The ASPE works together with the Security Manager to provide the necessary se-
curity facilities to protect the end-to-end and hop-by-hop authenticity of SNAP packet 
programs generated by the Active SNMP-EE. 
In active networks, hop-by-hop authentication should be included as well as end-
to-end authentication. Principle authentication must be performed at an intermediate 
node since the traversing active packet will be modified. In order to enforce both end-
to-end and hop-by-hop authenticity of active packets, we determine the static data of 
SNAP packet programs, and then encapsulate these data into ANEP separately from 
the SNAP dynamic data. We define the SNMP commands that are carried in the 
SNAP packet programs to be the static data; whereas the dynamic data is the SNAP 
packet itself (SNAP consists of a heap and a stack which are used to carry variable 
data) [13]. The eventual goal is to merge the ASPE with the SNAP Activator so that 
ANEP encapsulation can be performed whilst SNAP packets are being generated. Our 
current implementation fingerprints the SNAP packet (which contains both static and 
dynamic contents) before enforcing hop-by-hop protection. This static field will be 
digitally signed by the principle's private key (the digitally signing is performed at 
SEC), and the signature will be verified by each of the intermediate modifying nodes. 
The SNAP packet program is encapsulated entirely into Option-5. When an ANEP-
SNAP packet arrives at a hop node, the SNAP packet will be extracted from Option-
5, subjected to integrity and authenticity check by SEC. We use symmetric crypto-
graphic techniques. Under this arrangement, neighboring hops would have established 
a trusted relationship among themselves i.e. by creating a negotiated security associa-
tion (SA). With a SA, neighboring nodes can achieve peer authentication plus inter-
node integrity and confidentiality protection of active packets.  
3.1   Packet Flow in the ASPE 
In figure 7, a block diagram of the ASPE is depicted. (1) The SNAP Activator gener-
ates a SNAP packet. (2) The SNAP Analyser determines the VE-ID, EE-ID, destina-
tion IP address, the SNAP Packet ID and the SNAP static command from the SNAP 
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packet. (3) The Communication Manager uses the SNAP Packet ID as a reference to 
extract the corresponding Security ID (SID) in the Option-4 of this SNAP packet from 
its database, if no SID is found then this SNAP packet will be treated as a fresh 
packet. (4) The Digester provides additional internal integrity check for the SNAP 
packet. (5) The SNAP Encapsulator encapsulates the SNAP packet and the SNAP 
static command into ANEP Option-5 and the Payload field respectively. The SNAP 
Encapsulator then assigns the VE-ID, EE-ID, destination address and the SID of this 
SNAP packet to Option 1 to 4 respectively. (6) After that the ANEP-SNAP packet is 
transmitted to a local SEC for security provisioning before being forwarded to its next 
hop. (7) When an ANEP-SNAP packet arrives at its next hop, the De/MUX dis-
patches the packet to the SNAP De-Encapsulator after successful security checks per-
formed at SEC. (8) The SNAP De-Encapsulator extracts the SNAP packet Option-5. 
(9) The Digester performs internal security checks for Option-5. (10) If the destina-
tion of the ANEP-SNAP packet is not local then the SNAP Analyser will extract the 
SNAP packet ID and the Security ID from the SNAP packet and Option 4 respec-
tively, (11) The Communication Manager keeps this SNAP packet ID-SID pair in its 
database. The ID pair is needed by the SNAP Encapsulator for future ANEP-SNAP 
encapsulation. (12) The SNAP De-Encapsulator passes the SNAP packet to SNAP 
Activator for service control purposes. The same process is repeated at every travers-
ing node. 
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Fig. 7. Block diagram for ANEP-SNAP packet flow 
4   Dynamic Diffserv QoS Configuration and Consideration 
To test our architecture, we executed dynamic Diffserv QoS configuration. With re-
gard to QoS management by active networking, the management has been re-
ported[14]. However our main objective is not executing QoS management. The point 
is execution of application in the VE/EE.  
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In this test, a video flow was transmitted from Cambridge test-bed to Berlin test-
bed. A user tries to execute Diffserv transmission. The user connects Cambridge and 
Berlin through hybrid active network nodes (Hardware router and Active Proxy (VE 
with Diffserv controller)). The hardware router is just a box for transmission of packet 
based on priorities. The Active Proxy provides an environment to instantiate a Diff-
serv controller. Then the user assigns DSCP-0 to a video flow from the Cambridge 
test-bed and DSCP-8 is assigned to a jam flow in Berlin test-bed in the beginning. In 
this case, the jam traffic has a high priority. Therefore if the jam traffic fully con-
sumes available bandwidth for an output port of the hardware router, the video flow 
will suffer service degradation. To avoid this, SNAP active packet is injected from 
SNAP sender at Berlin to the video sender at Cambridge and the DSCP value of the 
video flow is changed from DSCP-0 to DSCP-56 at Cambridge. In this case, the video 
flow acquires higher priority than that of the jam flow. Therefore the video flow is 
transmitted unaffected by the jam flow. 
To realize the function, the VEM creates a new VE and basic components such as 
the De/MUX, the SEC and the RCF components including the Diffserv Controller in 
the Java-EE. In addition, the ACTIVE SNMP-EE is also created. To configure the ac-
tive nodes, the ACTIVE SNMP-EE injects a SNAP packet and the De/MUX inter-
cepts it. Integrity of the ANEP-SNAP packet is guaranteed by the SEC function and 
the RCF component assigns QoS to a specific flow dynamically. Through this test, 
the FAIN network provides a secure and dynamic network configuration. In addition, 
users can create their Diffserv controller in their VE and configure them independ-
ently. Besides, we have realized communication between the Java-EE and the 
ACTIVE SNMP-EE. Usual active network framework is constructed based on one 
EE. However, our framework is constructed based on resources. The users can create 
multiple EEs in VE. Therefore it supports communication between EEs. In this sense, 
our architecture has high flexibility. 
5   Conclusions and Future Work 
In this paper, we have described the detailed components of the FAIN active node 
framework based on the novel Virtual Environment (VE) concept. The VE framework 
provides the natural coexistence of multiple EEs in each VE and it is supporting inter-
actions between EEs. It has been validated by the communication between two types 
of Execution Environments: Java-EE and Active SNMP-EE. In addition, we have 
provided a secure control framework by the active packet. It has been guaranteed by 
the hop-by-hop and end-to-end authenticity and integrity checking of the active 
packet. Further more, we have controlled the Diffserv functions. In the near future, we 
will extend our framework to other resources and to other cases of autonomic de-
ployment of services bringing just the right services to the customer at just the right 
context. 
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